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Abstract 
The problem of the Spanish Succession kept the European diplomatic system in suspense 
from 1659 until 1713. Statesmen and diplomats tackled the question. Their practical vision 
of the law is a necessary complement to legal doctrine. Louis XIV and Emperor Leopold I 
used incompatible and  absolute claims, which started in private law and Spanish 
succession law. At the Peace of Utrecht, these arguments completely dissolved. The War of 
The Spanish Succession thus not only redesigned the political map of Europe. It altered the 
norm hierarchy in public law, strengthening international law as the framework of the 
“Société des Princes”. 
Introduction 
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701/1702-1713/1714) redesigned the political 
map of Europe. It sealed the definitive end of French encirclement by the Spanish 
Habsburgs. When Louis XIV died in September 1715, the heydays of the Spanish 
Monarchy were gone and a Bourbon King, his own grandson, reigned in Madrid. Both 
Spanish and French claims for universal monarchy had come to an endii. The Treaties of 
Utrecht and Rastadt/Baden created a balance of power on the continent between Versailles 
and Vienna, which was to last for 30 years. Finally, the war constituted the basis for British 
dominance as a commercial naval power, at the expense of the Dutch Republic.  
However, the War also constituted a milestone for international law, as this article 
aims to demonstrate. The Spanish Succession was the major legal quarrel of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Even after its solution, it occupied the mind of 
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the scholar. The originality of the solution proposed by the Treaty of Utrecht was the 
amendment of the fundamental laws of France and Spain, in order to conform to 
international realityiii. This strengthened the position of international norms, on the basis of 
changing power relations. 
The story of the Spanish Succession occurs at the crossroads of international 
relations -the playing field of power politicsiv- and international law –which aims to theorize 
and to structure the loose ensemble of sovereign states into a rule-bound international 
societyv. For the first time since 1648, the so called “Westphalian” system prospered in a 
peaceful environmentvi. The importance of 1648 as a landmark has been overstated in legal 
literature. Can one actually speak of a new world order after the Thirty Year‟s War, if it is 
followed by 70 years of nearly uninterrupted military conflict over the declining Spanish 
Empire ? Between 1701 and 1714, thirteen years of armed confrontationvii did not bring a 
decision. Politicians, diplomats and jurists solved the conflict, not generals and marshals. It 
is not before 1713 that we can discern an international system, guaranteeing its state 
participants‟ “life, truth and property” for an ensuing period of three decadesviii. 
 
Starting with a ticking timebomb in a marriage contract in 1659, the legal schemes 
to escape private law-based and politically incongruent patrimonial discourse give us proper 
insight in the context that gave birth to the theories of eighteenth-century authors such as 
Emer de Vattel (1714-1767)ix, Gaspard de Réal de Curban (1682-1752)x or Johann Jacob 
Moser (1701-1785)xi.  
The theorists of public international law have received perhaps not all, but certainly 
a substantial part of the necessary attention in legal researchxii. However, they operated 
outside the wheels of power and tended to incorporate a normative dimension in their 
works, which brought them close to political philosophy. They stated how the international 
system ought to work and tried to systematise what was not necessarily congruent in 
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practice. Their writings should therefore to be reinterpreted in the context of diplomatic 
practice and general historyxiii.  
The legal historian cannot limit himself to the law in the books, or, to be more 
precise, law in the treatises, if he wants to penetrate the working of the international 
system. If we take the French example, according to Frank Church, legal authors can be 
blamed for ceasing to be innovators in political theoryxiv. However, we should not forget 
that international law lived in the practice of statecraft, albeit behind the curtain of secrecy 
and raison d’état, without necessarily being brought out into the public printed spherexv.  
In this article, we want to point to the long-term trend in negotiations which leads 
to the settlement of 1713. A legal interpretation of what was for a long time dismissed as 
Rankean political history helps us to understand both the modernity and the persistent 
elder trends in the “legal pluralism” of the 18th century. Power differences establish a norm 
hierarchy between formal domestic constitutional law, succession law and treaties. 
We will proceed chronologically, starting with the 1659 peace treaty of the Pyrenees 
(I), following the question‟s evolution through Louis XIV‟s active reign (II) and concluding 
with the build-up to the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht (III). As the inter-dynastic imbrication of 
marriages is difficult to grasp without a graphic representation, we included a (simplified) 




I. The legal origins of a conflict: dowry, testament, custom 
“Mit den Pandekten wird die Welt nicht regiert” 
Robert von Mohlxvi 
A. Hugues de Lionne’s “moyennant”, a French contractual timebomb 
When the Thirty Years‟ War came to its conclusion in 1648, the pacification of 
Europe was only partial. France and Spain were still at war in the Rousillon and the 
Southern Netherlandsxvii. It was only with the Treaty of the Pyrenees (7 november 1659) 
that the antagonists, albeit temporarily, buried the war hatchet. 
As a symbol of reconciliation, Louis XIV (1638-1715) and Philip IV of Spain 
(1605-1665) exchanged the necessary ceremonial formalities for the peace on a platform on 
the Bidassoa River separating their kingdoms. Their agreement encompassed two themes. 
First, a peace treaty, ending the Franco-Spanish war that started in 1635xviii, secondly, a 
Bourbon-Habsburg marriage with lasting consequences for Europe: the union between 
Louis XIV and the infanta Maria Teresia (1638-1683), eldest daughter to Philip IV.  
The Austrian branch of the house of Habsburg, which had been delivering the 
candidates for the first Infanta‟s hand for generations, made peace with the 5 year-old 
Louis XIV in 1648. Consequently, Vienna left Spain‟s “Planet King” Philip IV behind with 
an insurrection in Portugal and a full-scale war with France on his hands. Thus, when 
Cardinal Mazarin (1602-1661) and don Luis de Haro (1598-1661) negotiated a peace 
agreement, the proposal of Maria Teresa‟s hand was a possibility. 
 Consequently, Louis XIV was offered a “stock-option” on the Spanish Monarchy. 
Controlling Spain, Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan Presidia, Milan, Franche-Comté, the Spanish 
Netherlands and the overseas colonies, the Spanish Habsburg branch still held its rank as a 
territorial colossus, notwithstanding its financial and administrative strainsxix.  
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In dynastic practice, marriages between French and Spanish princes had been 
common. Due to the absence of a rule of female exclusion in Spanish public law, weddings 
never went ahead without a renunciation clause, whereby the spouse forfeited her claims 
on the Spanish crown, in exchange for the dowry agreed between her husband and her 
reigning fatherxx. Well aware of this practice, Hugues de Lionne (1611-1671), member of 
the French negotiating team, suggested the insertion of a supplementary condition in the 
dowry clause of the marriage contract of 1659. Maria Teresa‟s renunciation was only to be 
effective “moyennant” the payment of 500 000 écus as a dowry (art. 4xxi). This argument 
was upheld by French diplomats throughout the succession crisis and the negotiations, 
until the end of the War. Maria Teresa could not be excluded from her father‟s succession. 
Her renunciation was an obligation exclusively caused by and tied to the payment of a 
considerable sum of money. This payment was never executed by the Spanish king. 
Consequently, the exception non adimpleti contractus came into play: when Spain defaulted on 
its obligation, the remainder of the contractual obligations stricti iuris ceased to existxxii.  
 In contrast to the French interpretation, the Spanish negotiators firmly insisted on 
the limited character of the “moyennant”-clause. The Habsburg Monarchy would never 
have agreed to a text if it were to contain this reversal, threatening the unity of inheritance 
of its composite territories. Article 4 of the marriage contract only concerned private 
property. Article 5, where the King‟s public domainxxiii was concerned, expressly stated 
Maria Teresa‟s exclusion, without a countervailing obligation to pay. Moreover, even in the 
restricted case of the private renunciation, the conditionality of the exclusion could not 
affect the obligations of Maria Teresa: the marriage contract was a contractus bonae fidei. 
Obligations originating in it stood on their own: the debtor could not be liberated by the 
non-performance of his contract partnerxxiv.  
The French interpretation ignored the Spanish private/public distinction. 
According to French public law, public and private royal domain were assimilated. The 
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private obligation to pay the dowry could not be interpreted as separated from the public 
renunciation. The conditionality of Maria Teresa‟s exclusion thus applies to the public 
domain as well xxv.  
B. Keeping the House of Austria intact: Philip IV’s Testament (1665) 
After solemn registration of the Pyrenees Treaty and the subsequent renunciations 
in the Cortes as well as in the Parlement de Paris, the course of events deteriorated the 
Madrilen position. Philip IV had only one male heir in 1659, the infant Felipe Próspero, 
born two years earlier. In September 1661, this prince died, creating an opportunity for 
Louis XIV to claim the entire Spanish Monarchy on behalf of his own son, Louis, the 
“Grand Dauphin”xxvi, born on the first of November 1661. 
 The birth of the infant Carlos José (5th of November 1661) came as a general relief 
in Madrid. Although the new born‟s health was in a very poor state, a characteristic to 
remain constant during the 39 remaining years, the King of Spain had produced a new male 
heirxxvii. 
In an attempt to revive intra-Habsburg dynastic relations, Emperor Leopold I 
(1640-1705xxviii) espoused the 12 year-old Infanta Margareta Teresia, the older sister of the 
infant Carlos (1651-1673) in 1666. In a secret annex to the marriage contract (18 December 
1663xxix), Philip IV obliged the Emperor and his new bride to send their second son to 
Madrid for his education and thus to found a second branch of the Habsburg Monarchy in 
the Southern Netherlandsxxx. 
 
 On 17 September 1665, two years after the redaction of Margareta Teresia‟s 
Marriage Contract, Philip IV died. In order to buttress the Spanish succession against 
French claims, a council of Spanish theologians and jurists repeated their interpretation of 
the Marriage Contract in a unilateral declaration in the dying Monarch‟s testamentxxxi. 
Following his predecessor Philip III‟ will, consideration 15 explicitly made the legal regime 
7 
  
of Queen Anna of Austria and Louis XIII‟ marriage, whose contract contained the identical 
articles V and VI, applicable to Maria Teresia‟s unionxxxii. Maria Teresia could only be 
reinstated as an heir to the throne in case of childlessness (which equalled the decease of 
the Grand Dauphin). As to the 500 000 écus dowry, the King urged his successor to pay 
the due sumxxxiii.  
 For Madrid, strengthening the house of Habsburg was the core of the Spanish 
Successionxxxiv. Since the days of Joan the Mad and Philip the Fair and the subsequent 
scission of the two branches between Charles V and Ferdinand I, dynastic loyalty had not 
been broken. In view of Maria Teresa‟s union with Louis XIV, the argument needed to be 
repeated, making clear that the offering of her hand to the French king in 1659 had been 
an exception to a general rule.  
Consequently, since Maria Teresia was excluded, in the case of Carlos‟ decease, the 
Regency Council (established to exercise authority jointly with the relatively young widow 
Maria-Annaxxxv) had to call on his older sister Margareta Teresia and her descendantsxxxvi. 
Here was the reason for the delay of the Austrian marriage (18 December 1663-25 April 
1666). “Étant fort petite et délicate par son âge”xxxvii, Margareta Teresia had to remain in 
Madrid until light would have been shed on the survival chances of the struggling Carlos 
José.  
After Margareta Teresia, two further categories of successors were named: 
- the descendants of Infanta Maria-Anna (1606-1646), sister to Philip IV and the 
spouse of the late Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III (1608-1657xxxviii), inclosing those of 
her son, Emperor Leopold I, from his subsequent marriages, in case Margareta Teresia 
would not give birth to an heir 
- the House of Savoyxxxix. 
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C. Low Countries customs: the legal war of devolution (1667-1668)xl 
“En pays de dévolution, on ne peut abroger la loi 
par contrat de mariage : un mariage, même royal, 
est un acte commun” 
Antoine Bilain, Traité des droits de la reine (1667)xli 
 
“Que si ce n‟est pas une rupture, c‟est une 
intrusion violente : si ce n‟est pas une Guerre, c‟est 
un brigandage & une piraterie ; & si ce n‟est pas 
une infraction de la Paix, c‟est un injuste attentat 
qui choque toutes les Loix & toutes les formes […] 
Il n‟y a donc que les Traictés publics qui puissent 
mettre des bornes à ses prétentions” 
Franz Paul von Lisola, Bouclier d’estat (1667)xlii 
 
Following Philip IV‟s death, Hugues de Lionne could activate his carefully inserted 
“moyennant”-clause. Maria Teresia was the most senior surviving heir and the Salic Law, 
excluding women from succession, did not apply in the Spanish kingdoms. Since 1663, a 
team of jurists had been operating in the Louvre on order of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis 
XIV‟s “contrôleur-général des finances” and prepared a propaganda storm. The Traité des 
droits de la reine très-chrétiennexliii, compiled under the name of Antoine Bilain, defended the 
French thesis with two core arguments.  
- an application of the causal theory in the private law of obligations to Maria 
Teresa‟s renunciationxliv 
- in addition to the “moyennant”-clause, an appeal to customary law.  
As a daughter born from Philip IV‟s first marriage, Maria Teresia could rightfully 
claim a series of counties and duchies in the Southern Netherlands on the basis of the law 
of devolutionxlv. In force of the latter, children from the second marriage could not inherit 
any territory held by the common parent up to the decease of his first spouse, since the 
“propriété nue” had to remain with the children from the first marriage, to prevent them 
from suffering any material discrimination.  
The legally more coherent attack on the dowry-settlement came from the angle 
Hugues de Lionne prepared eight years earlier. The renunciation was a contractual 
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obligation, which had only come into being because of a countervailing obligation freely 
consented to by Philip IV (and reiterated in his 1665 Testament): the payment of 500 000 
écus. The fixed calendar for the payments had not been respected (dies interpellat pro 
hominexlvi), which enabled the French court to invoke the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in 
order to liberate itself from the renunciation. Louis XIV could then dispense of the 
obligation of sending a formal declaration of war. He merely took possession, in his 
spouse‟s name, of what rightfully belonged to her as her father‟s daughter. 
In answer to Bilain‟s pamphlet, the imperial diplomat Franz Paul von Lisola (1613-
1674xlvii) brandished his Bouclier d’Estat against the French claims. It was not the only 
publicationxlviii attacking the French private law-based reasoning, but we see it as the most 
pertinent to the general development of international public law.  
Lisola reformulated arguments used by others. For instance, the autonomy of 
public and private law, with respect to Charles V‟s Pragmatic Sanction, which prohibited the 
fragmented inheritance of the Southern Netherlands. But the main maxim of his writings 
was a strong claim against French universal monarchy. When tensions around the 
Succession were again imminent in 1700, Lisola‟s text was reprinted and most of his 
arguments were repeated in new writingsxlix. In his pamphlet, we find the theoretical basis 
of the supremacy of the international legal order over the domestic.  
The dispute the French king wanted to settle by arms, existed between sovereigns. 
They did not have to count with a superior judicial authority, unless Louis wanted to act on 
behalf of his wife as a vassal to the German Emperor, in which case he could take his 
demand before the Reichskammergerichtl. The Imperial origins of the law of devolution 
being one of the French arguments in favour of Maria Teresia‟s rights as first born 
daughter, this should have been the most appropriate way to deal with the case on a private 
law basis (as the French pamphlet argued).  
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However, as the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549 and the Transaction of Augsburg in 
1548, detaching the Southern Netherlands as a whole from most of their imperial 
obligations, had already shown, these private norms were not pertinentli. Moreover, Maria 
Teresia‟s renunciation, which was unconditional for the public possessionslii she could 
inherit from Philip IV, was linked to article 33 of the Peace of the Pyrenees.  
The king of France had the sovereign right to go to war, tearing up the peace treaty 
of the Pyrenees, or to settle by another treaty. Treaties, however, were in no way similar to 
private legal acts. They were concluded in order to avert war. Since war was the gravest of 
all ills that could befall a nation, the norms that averted it had a higher legal authority than 
any other. Public International law was a forum of its own. If the French king felt 
dissatisfied with a sovereign act of one of his fellow monarchs, he had to negotiate or to 
declare war formally.  
However, taking into account the chaotic state of nature sovereigns are in with 
respect to each other, it was only through mutual arrangement that an international society 
could be built. The monarch who exposed his infidelity as a contractual partner, threatened 
the overall security the system ought to guarantee to every participantliii. Lisola explained 
this argument with respect to the de facto political bargain behind the Peace of the Pyrenees. 
If Louis XIV had to accept Maria Teresia‟s renunciation, it was because of a countervailing 
concession by Philip IV. In fact, in 1659, Spain had ceded considerable parts of the 




II. Treaties as a solution: partition or go to war 
“Was hat die Staatskunst nicht alles 
versucht, um die spanische Erbfolge im 
voraus zu regeln, und wie haben doch die 
Ereignisse die Pläne der Minister auf den 
Kopf gestellt!” 
Frederick II of Prussia (1712-1786), Politisches 
Testament (1768liv) 
 
After the War of Devolution, Charles II sat infirmly on the Spanish throne, 
dominated by his Austrian mother Maria Anna of Austria and the revolting “Grandes”lv. 
Thirty years later, the situation was not much more favourable. The declining health of the 
Spanish sovereign reached a point where Louis XIV and William III, stadholder in the 
Republic but since 1689 King of England, Scotland and Ireland, felt able to divide Charles‟ 
succession between the Austrian and French pretenders, over the head of his Spanish 
counsellors. 
At this point, the legal value underpinning a political compromise was no longer the 
respect of Philip IV‟s will or of Maria Teresia‟s rights. The overall European balance of 
power, which had been invoked by Lisola to stop Louis XIV, “engloutisseur de pays à tort 
et à traverslvi”, which had mobilised the ensuing alliances against him, imposed a fair and 
equal division of the Spanish Empire. 
A. Spain discarded: the Bavarian partition (1697-1699) 
An arrangement on the Spanish Succession between the still formidable French 
army and the Maritime Powers equalled a true European settlementlvii. “The French 
tyrantlviii” was a player with a vested interest in the Spanish Succession. However, it was in 
his full interest to diminish his claims and to settle for a secure, even if less important, part 
of the inheritance, if this meant diminishing the Austrian Habsburg booty.  
Louis and William discarded all of the previous norms, because it was necessary to 
conserve the tranquillity of Europe recently established at the peace of Rijswijklix. The 
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infant Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria, born in 1692 was to succeed to Charles II in 
Madrid, with the exception of the territories assigned to the French Grand Dauphin and 
the Austrian Archduke Charles (1683-1740) (art. V). Although he was a grandson of 
Margareta Teresia and Emperor Leopold, he was, nevertheless, in the first place the heir to 
the house of Wittelsbach. Joseph Ferdinand thus covered Dutch and British overseas trade 
and strategic interests, guaranteeing a barrier against Francelx. In exchange, Louis claimed 
the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Tuscan presidia, Finale, Guipuzcoa and parts of 
Navarra, establishing a strong French position in the Mediterranean (art. IV)lxi. These 
territories were to be ruled by the Grand Dauphin, who would unite them to France once 
he became king. The Austrian candidate had to content himself with the duchy  of Milan 
(art. VI).  
This agreement was acceptable to Louis. But, most important of all, it was enforceable 
(art. IX)lxii, since it was backed by both London and The Hague, who provided the treasury 
for every alliance against Versailles.  Charles‟ protest from Madrid against the division of 
his inheritance did not have any effectlxiii. Moreover, Maria Antonia, Joseph Ferdinand‟s 
mother and Margareta Teresia‟s daughter, had renounced to her rights to the Spanish 
throne when she married Elector Maximilian II Emmanuel of Bavaria in 1685lxiv. Neither 
of these unilateral objections to the treaty stood in the way of its realisation. 
 
The imperial reaction was furious. However, Vienna did not always refuse a 
multilateral settlement of the Spanish question. Austrian opposition to the Franco-British 
proposals in 1697 sharply contrasted with the Emperor‟s attitude during the Devolution 
War. In January 1668, Louis XIV‟s extraordinary envoy de Grémonville managed to sign a 
secret bilateral Franco-Austrian partition deallxv. Willing to leave the Spanish Netherlands to 
France, Leopold was mainly interested in the acquisition of Italy.  
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The legal importance of the Grémonville treaty was constituted by the fact that it 
pushed the Spanish Succession out of the realm of private law (the appeal to the Law of 
Devolution formulated in 1667) and of Spanish national public law (where the Testament 
of Philip IV of 1665 commanded the unitary succession and Maria Teresia‟s renunciation 
of 1660 excluded the Bourbons). Leopold explicitly recognized the right of the Dauphin 
(born in 1661) to succeed to Charles II, by virtue of his direct descendence from Philip IV, 
his grandfather. He thereby attested the unreasonableness of an Austrian claim on the 
whole Spanish inheritance, to the exclusion of the French pretender. 
At the time of the Grémonville Treaty, a quick succession was expected. If Charles 
II would have passed away, this arrangement between the two pretenders, which explicitly 
named la conservation de l’Europe et de la chrétientélxvi as a pretext for the division of the Spanish 
lands by treaty, would have had a very good chance of coming into effect. The binary 
choice was clear: partition or go to war. As Lisola indicated, the weight of this choice was 
sufficient to cast aside or to modify the norms from other legal orders as prestigious as 
fundamental (succession) laws. 
B. The impossible triangular balance (1699-1700) 
“La perte du petit Ferdinand-Joseph était une 
véritable calamité pour l‟Europe, car elle ruinait la 
base d‟un projet d‟équilibre continental” 
Arsène Legrellelxvii 
 
When Joseph Ferdinand suddenly succumbed to illness in Brussels at the age of six, 
the whole partition effort had to start over again. But the context made a new binary 
partition between Vienna and Versailles impossible.  
 
(1) In 1699, geopolitical circumstances had become very favourable to the house of 
Habsburglxviii. Leopold I no longer thought of acquiescence in the succession 
quarrel. The Treaty of Rijswijk kept Louis XIV out of the Holy Roman Empire 
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in the West. Turkish Hungary was regained with the Treaty of Carlowitz, more 
than doubling the hereditary lands in surface. The Emperor could now aspire to 
become Louis XIV‟s de facto equal. Going to war against France was not any 
longer a remote possibility, but a real one. Archduke Charles had to found a 
second branch of the dynasty in Madrid, taking the whole inheritance for 
Habsburg, including the Italian possessions.  
 
(2) The second partition treatylxix was also more contentious in the Franco-English 
relationship, since Louis and William had to strike a balance between the two 
direct competitors, Louis of France and Charles of Habsburg. If the possession 
of the Belgian buffer and control of the maritime links to the colonies (which 
were absolutely vital to William) could not fall into French hands, this meant 
compensations had to be found in Italylxx. Clearly, this division did not take 
account of the prime strategic interests of Emperor Leopold, who was now 
stripped off the Italian territories. William thus left the door open for an 
acrimonious competition between the unsatisfied Emperor and Versailles, and 
to a possible breakdown of the partition systemlxxi.   
 
(3) In a triangular relationship between Leopold, William and Louis, one party had 
to come out as unsatisfied. Due to the absence of the Bavarian alternative, the 
French part of the spoils increased, to the detriment of the Emperor, who 
could direct his diplomatic initiatives at the Maritime Powers and detach them 
from the agreement with France. 
C. Pyrrhic victory in Madrid (1697-1700): Louis XIV prepares for war 
“Soyez bon Espagnol, c‟est présentement votre 
premier devoir ; mais souvenez-vous que vous êtes 
né Français pour entretenir l‟union entre les deux 
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nations ; c‟est le moyen de les rendre heureuses et de 
conserver la paix de l‟Europe” 
Louis XIV to Philip of Anjou, 16.XI.1700lxxii 
 
The monarchs did not follow the partition treaties in 1700. Even worse, another 
pan-European conflict erupted, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths, precisely what 
Louis XIV and William III had intended to avoid. Mistrust, however, was present on both 
sides. After Joseph Ferdinand‟s decease, the French court did not fully engage in 
negotiations with William. A second diplomatic stage opened in Spain, creating a ferocious 
opposition between Austrian and French ministers. Charles II‟s court resented the Franco-
English partition game and still stuck to the theatre of national public law to settle the 
inheritance.  
Leopold counted on his ambassador to make Charles II confirm Philip IV‟s will in 
his testament, to have a valid pretext to get around the second partition treaty. However, 
French diplomats achieved such successes in networking, that the “Austrian party” around 
Charles‟ second wife, Anna-Maria von Neubourg, lost ground with the “Grande” elite. 
Capturing important pieces on the chessboard like cardinal Portocarrero of Toledo (1635-
1709), the French extraordinary envoy de Blécourt succeeded in thwarting the Habsburg 
plan.  
On the second of October 1700, Charles II signed his last testamentlxxiii, repealing 
the renunciation of the late Maria Teresialxxiv. The document was drafted to the benefit of 
Philip of Anjou (1682-1746)lxxv, second grandson to Louis XIV. Its motivation was entirely 
silent on the legal grounds on the basis of which Charles II could put aside Philip IV‟s will. 
The decision was purely political: no argument was given why the union of France and 
Spain would not be less prejudicial in 1700, than in 1665, 1659 or 1615. Moreover, Philip 
was to become Charles‟ first successor in all of his domains, which ran against the opinion of 
all major powerslxxvi.  
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The War of the Spanish Succession had virtually begun. An impatient Leopold I 
dispatched Eugen of Savoy with 30 000 troops to reclaim the duchy of Milan. The 
Emperor accorded its investiture to his own son Archduke Charles in March 1701 and 
firmly brandished his absolute claim to the whole inheritance, six months before the 
conclusion of the Grand Alliance of The Haguelxxvii. Preparing to fight a European war 
with, rather than against the Spanish, Louis XIV accepted the testament, throwing years of 
negotiation awaylxxviii. He astutely claimed the French asiento de negros for the Guinea 
Companylxxix and sent Marchal Boufflers to occupy the Dutch Barrier fortresses in the 
Southern Netherlands (February 1701), on invitation of his 17-year old grandson, the new 
ruler of Spain.  
In spite of the early recognition of Philip V by the States-General in The Hague, 
William III advantageously used Louis XIV‟s continuing support of the chased catholic 
Stuart monarchy to swing both of the Houses of Parliament on his side. The Spanish 
Netherlands, taken away by Boufflers, should serve as a repagulum, vulgo Barrière to the 
Republiclxxx. On the 15th of May 1702, the Grand Alliance of The Hague declared war on 
Louis, with officially nothing but the conservation of Europe‟s equilibrium and tranquillity 
in mind. The Emperor was to receive aequa et rationi conveniens satisfactio in the question of 




III. Compromise through equilibrium (1702-1713/1714) 
 
“Vous avouerez, Monsieur, que jamais 
monarque n‟étant fait pour l‟amour de la 
paix, ny porté aussy loin les facilitez pour le 
retablissement du repos general de l‟Europe” 
Torcy to Bolingbroke, 7.VIII.1712lxxxii 
 
Military success changed sides quite often during the conflictlxxxiii. Given the 
practical constraints brought about by the cold season, the winter months left manoeuvring 
room for every participant‟s diplomacy to destabilise the opponent. French diplomats 
targeted the Dutch Republic in the first place. William III deceased early in the war (8 
March 1702), even before it was officially declared. A subtle rift arose between Britain and 
the Republic: national interests of both maritime powers were incompatible in the long 
runlxxxiv. Therefore, the regents of the province of Holland, who adhered to the Partition 
treaties of 1697 and 1700, seemed the perfect audience for a reasonable exit out of a costly 
and useless war.  
A. Lost opportunities: the case of Holland, 1707-1708 
Between the campaigns of 1707 and 1708lxxxv, Colbert de Torcy tried to approach 
the Dutch Regents through an unconventional channel. Tradesman Nicolas Mesnager 
(1658-1714) counted on the political divisions in the Dutch Republic. On one hand, the 
evermore pressing cost of the warlxxxvi, on the other, the growing competitive disadvantage 
caused by booming British tradelxxxvii, diminished the merchants‟ interest in pursuing it 
against the French, from whom few was to be gained.  
 At that time, accepting the military status quo of 1707, which equalled leaving the 
Italian territories of the Spanish Monarchy to Charles of Austrialxxxviii, and Spain and the 
colonies to Philip Vlxxxix, was not prejudicial to the prosperity of the Dutch.  A multilateral 
treatyxc should guarantee all nations of Europe access to the port of Cadiz, the gateway to 
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Spanish America and the Indies.  At the same time, Mesnager assured Versailles that 
France could well have the upper hand on Spanish commercexci. 
In spite of Mesnager‟s orientations, two factors prevented deeper discussion. 
Internally, a deliberate violation of the negotiations‟ secret by Michel Chamillart (1652-
1721), War Secretary and a political rival to Torcyxcii. Externally, Dutch nervousness at 
misleading the British allies put an end to the informal talksxciii. This refusal, repeated in 
subsequent negotiationsxciv, was to prove a fatal error to the Republic, since it found itself 
overtaken by Britain on the seas and exhausted because of the warxcv.  
B. The Franco-British “revirement”, 1710-1711 
While combat was raging in the North of France, in Spain, on the Rhine and in the 
colonies, the stubborn Dutch refusal between the campaigns was to be heavily paidxcvi. 
Exploiting British political turmoil, Nicolas Mesnager extracted a deal out of the victorious 
Tory ministry in 1711, applying the principles of the earlier partitions. At this point, 
international law finally acquired its autonomy in the question of the Spanish Succession. 
Could a solution be imposed ignoring all of the fastidious national succession norms, even 
though it failed ten years earlier?  
The Preliminaries concluded by Nicolas Mesnager and Henry St-Johnxcvii in 
November 1711 and the Franco-English entente were as important to the European State 
System as the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756xcviii.  By this agreementxcix, France accepted 
the British barrier in the Southern Netherlands, its commercial ambitions in the New 
World and the Protestant successionc. In exchange, Britain ratified Louis‟ acquisitions up to 
1697 and the French armed North-Eastern frontier. For the sake of the European Balance, 
British diplomacy openly left the House of Austria, the majority of German princes and  
the Dutch Republic to fight Louis XIV‟s armies aloneci. 
Archduke Charles of Austria, who had been unable to conquer the whole of Spain, 
was elected Holy Roman Emperor after the decease of his brother Joseph I (17 April 
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1711cii). De facto, Britain chose the partition solution it advocated in 1697 and 1700. Not 
only French military resilienceciii, but most of all the physical and resurrection of Charles 
V‟s sixteenth-century Empire in the person of the new Emperor-King Charles VI worked 
against dynastic Habsburg ambition.  
C. All successions internationalised, 1712-1714 
“D‟autant que la Guerre, que la présente 
Paix doit éteindre, a été allumée 
principalement, parce que la seureté et la 
liberté de l‟Europe ne pouvoient pas 
absolument souffrir que les Couronnes de 
France & d‟Espagne fussent réünies sous 
une même teste, & que sur les instances de 
Sa Majesté Britannique, & du consentement 
tant de S.M.T.C. que de S.M. Cath. on est 
enfin parvenu, par un effet de la 
Providence Divine, à prévenir ce mal pour 
tous les tems à venir, moiennant des 
Rénonciations conçûes dans la meilleure 
forme, & faites en la maniére la plus 
solemnelle.” 
Art. VI, French/British Treaty of Peaceciv 
 
The political Franco-British compromise, based on trade and territorial balance, 
was extended to the rest of Europe by the treaties of Utrecht of 11 April 1713cv. At the end 
of 1713, Eugene of Savoy and Marshal Villars began negotiations between France and the 
Empire at Rastadtcvi. The territorial concrete changes are of minor interest to the 
development of this articlecvii. However, the way in which stabilisation was achieved, shows 
a radically different solution to dynastic problems: 
 
(1) As a counterpart to the international recognition of Philip on the Spanish 
throne, both he and Maria Teresia‟s remaining descendants had to renounce their 
incompatible claims on either of the Bourbon inheritances (cf. quotation above). The 
Dukes of Orléans (Louis XIV‟ younger brother) and Berry (Philip‟s younger brother) had 
to make a solemn declaration, registered by the Parliament of Pariscviii. Philip had to do the 
same before the Cortescix. These documents were but a formal domestic translation of an 
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international agreement, as was already foreseen in the 1698 partition treaty between 
William III and Louis XIVcx.   
(2) In addition to this, the conclusion of the Spanish Succession question 
internationally fixed the case of the royal succession in Britain, where Queen Anne (1664-
1714) had no Protestant heircxi. Just as Philip IV‟s testament was insufficient to guarantee 
the Spanish Succession, the 1701 Act of Settlement needed international approval. In the 
view of the Jacobite party, which was used by Louis XIV during the war as a destabilising 
element behind enemy lines, the arrival of Georg of Hannover (1660-1727) ran contrary to 
the normal succession rulescxii. 
(3) When we turn to the situation of the Habsburg Emperor (the partner least 
willing to accept an international solution to the Spanish problem), the same pattern 
imposed itself. Emperor Charles VI wanted preferential treatment for his daughters, to the 
detriment of those of his older brother, the late Emperor Joseph I. Internal recognition of 
the exercise of centralized authority implied the acceptation of the Emperor‟s own 1713 
“Pragmatic Sanction”cxiii by all of the Habsburg lands in their State Assemblies. In a 
tiresome and self-torturing quest, Charles, ironically the symbol of unilateral and absolute 
claims in the Spanish Succession, needed to get this approved by the main international 
players as well. Since succession disputes were international, the norms governing them 
needed to be touched upon by every actor. As Kunischcxiv remarks, the movement in which 
Charles wanted to put his own daughters before those of his late brother Joseph, was 
exemplary of a larger process, touching all European powers. Even the Emperor, who 
traditionally held a superior position in the European concertcxv, had to conform to this.  
Conclusion: the legal shadow of the Spanish Succession 
“C‟est une erreur qui vient de ce que ce 
Jurisconsulte raisonnoit, dans une matière du 
Droit des Gens, sur les principes du Droit Civil 
qui n‟y ont aucune application. Mille Ecrivains 
François ont copié cette erreur de Bodin. ” 
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Réal de Curban (1764), condemning the 
elevation of the lois fondamentales above treaty 
obligationscxvi 
 
 Earlier in our present contribution, in his devastating attack on Bilain‟s devolution 
pamphlet (1667), Lisola argued that the French King made an error in the choice of his 
forum. Private persons and Monarchs did not pass before the same judges and they did not 
obey to the same laws. Violate a treaty, whole societies go down in flames. Violate a 
contract, be judged in court. In essence, the War of the Spanish Succession demonstrated 
that no sovereign could get his way with a distorted unilateral claim as if he would have 
been but one of his subjects quarrelling over an inheritance.   
This applied as well to the French, as to the Austrian pretentions. Even the most 
powerful sovereigns could not withstand the whole of Europe. France failed to claim 
military victory, even in association with the Spanish Bourbons. Austria and the Republic 
could not beat France without British assistance. A transgressor could be sanctioned by the 
actors of the European “Anarchical Society”, but only in a continent-wide war (1702-
1713/1714), which was to be avoided in any case after a century of almost continuous 
warfarecxvii. 
Thus, geopolitical giants could not unilaterally decide international problems, as 
Philip IV and Charles II tried to in their respective wills, affirming domestic theoretical 
indivisibility over political reality; nor could they practice legal cherry-picking as Louis did 
in the War of Devolution and Leopold with his March 1701 claim on Milan. Even if the 
Utrecht and Rastadt Treaties resided politically on a bilateral agreement, they made a 
generalised application of the core European norm in international relations: the avoidance 
of hegemony, and thus the need to continuously manage a delicate balance between 
multiple actors. In order to achieve this, actors needed to frame their demands in mutually 
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